Categoria: wp2007

Nikolay Nenovsky
Bulgarian National Bank, University of Orléans, ICER
Giovanni Pavanelli
Department of Economics “G. Prato”, University of Torino
Kalina Dimitrova
Bulgarian National Bank, Sveti Kliment Ohridski University of Sofia, ICER

Abstract: This paper analyses exchange rate control measures adopted in Italy and Bulgaria during the interwar period. The first two sections provide a detailed account of the institutional and economic framework in which these measures were enforced and interpret them utilizing statistical data. In the third section it suggests a theoretical interpretation of exchange control and clearing agreements stressing that these policies were a serious interference in market mechanisms.

Many scholars assert that the process of privatizing state-owned firms in Central and
Eastern Europe has been a success because privatized firms are performing better than
they did before. The assertion is an empty piece of poetry. To begin with, privately
owned firms are more efficient than state owned firms.

Hence, the evaluation of the process of privatization in Central and Eastern Europe does not depend on some
measured efficiency of privatized firms. The evaluation of privatization should be based
on the contribution of privatized firms to the attainment of two major initial objectives
of institutional restructuring in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe: the
acceptance of capitalism and the development of free-market, private-property
institutions.